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Abstract. Harmful Internet hijacking incidents put in evidence how
fragile the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is, which is used to exchange
routing information between Autonomous Systems (ASes). As proved by
recent research contributions, even S-BGP, the secure variant of BGP
that is being deployed, is not fully able to blunt traffic attraction attacks.
Given a traffic flow between two ASes, we study how difficult it is for a
malicious AS to devise a strategy for hijacking or intercepting that flow.
We show that this problem marks a sharp difference between BGP and
S-BGP. Namely, while it is solvable, under reasonable assumptions, in
polynomial time for the type of attacks that are usually performed in
BGP, it is NP-hard for S-BGP. Our study has several by-products. E.g.,
we solve a problem left open in the literature, stating when performing
a hijacking in S-BGP is equivalent to performing an interception.
1 Introduction and Overview
On 24th Feb. 2008, Pakistan Telecom started an unauthorized announcement of
prefix 208.65.153.0/24 [14]. This announcement was propagated to the rest of
the Internet, which resulted in the hijacking of YouTube traffic on a global scale.
Incidents like this put in evidence how fragile is the Border Gateway Protocol
(BGP) [11], which is used to exchange routing information between Internet
Service Providers (ISPs). Indeed, performing a hijacking attack is a relatively
simple task. It suffices to issue a BGP announcement of a victim prefix from
a border router of a malicious (or unaware) Autonomous System (AS). Part
of the traffic addressed to the prefix will be routed towards the malicious AS
rather than to the intended destination. A mischievous variation of the hijacking
is the interception when, after passing through the malicious AS, the traffic is
forwarded to the correct destination. This allows the rogue AS to eavesdrop or
even modify the transit packets.
In order to cope with this security vulnerability, a variant of BGP, called S-
BGP [9], has been proposed, that requires a PKI infrastructure both to validate
⋆ The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com.
AS-paths of Bounded AS-path Bounded AS-path
any length length length and AS degree
Origin-spoofing NP-hard (Thm. 1) P(Thm. 2) P
S-BGP NP-hard NP-hard (Thm. 3) P(Thm. 4)
Table 1: Complexity of finding a hijack strategy in different settings.
the correctness of the AS that originates a prefix and to allow an AS to sign its
announcements to other ASes. In this setting an AS cannot forge announcements
that do not derive from announcements received from its neighbors. However,
[4] contains surprising results: (i) simple hijacking strategies are tremendously
effective and (ii) finding a strategy that maximizes the amount of traffic that is
hijacked is NP-hard both for BGP and for S-BGP.
In this paper we tackle the hijacking and interception problems from a new
perspective. Namely, given a traffic flow between two ASes, how difficult is it for
a malicious AS to devise a strategy for hijacking or intercepting at least that
specific flow? We show that this problem marks a sharp difference between BGP
and S-BGP. Namely, while it is polynomial time solvable, under reasonable as-
sumptions, for typical BGP attacks, it is NP-hard for S-BGP. This gives new
complexity related evidence of the effectiveness of the adoption of S-BGP. Also,
we solve an open problem [4], showing when every hijack in S-BGP results in
an interception. Tab. 1 summarizes our results. Rows correspond to different
settings for a malicious AS m. The origin-spoofing setting (Sect. 2) corresponds
to a scenario where m issues BGP announcements pretending to be the owner
of a prefix. Its degree of freedom is to choose a subset of its neighbors for such
a bogus announcement. This is the most common type of hijacking attack to
BGP [1]. In S-BGP (Sect. 3) m must enforce the constraints imposed by S-BGP,
which does not allow to pretend to be the owner of a prefix that is assigned to
another AS. Columns of Tab. 1 correspond to different assumptions about the
Internet. In the first column we assume that the longest valley-free path (i.e.
a path enforcing certain customer-provider constraints) in the Internet can be
of arbitrary length. This column has a theoretical interest since the length of
the longest path (and hence valley-free path) observed in the Internet remained
constant even though the Internet has been growing in terms of active AS num-
bers during the last 15 years [8]. Moreover, in today’s Internet about 95% of
the ASes is reached in 3 AS hops [8]. Hence, the second column corresponds to
a quite realistic Internet, where the AS-path length is bounded by a constant.
In the third column we assume that the number of neighbors of m is bounded
by a constant. This is typical in the periphery of the Internet. A “P” means
that a Polynomial-time algorithm exists. Since moving from left to right the set-
ting is more constrained, we prove only the rightmost NP-hardness results, since
they imply the NP-hardness results to their left. Analogously, we prove only the
leftmost “P” results.
1.1 A Model for BGP Routing
As in previous work on interdomain hijacking [4], we model the Internet as a
graph G = (V,E). A vertex in V is an Autonomous System (AS). Edges in E are
peerings (i.e., connections) between ASes. A vertex owns one or more prefixes,
i.e., sets of contiguous IP numbers. The routes used to reach prefixes are spread
and selected via BGP. Since each prefix is handled independently by BGP, we
focus on a single prefix pi, owned by a destination vertex d.
BGP allows each AS to autonomously specify which paths are forbidden
(import policy), how to choose the best path among those available to reach a
destination (selection policy), and a subset of neighbors to whom the best path
should be announced (export policy). BGP works as follows. Vertex d initializes
the routing process by sending announcements to (a subset of) its neighbors.
Such announcements contain pi and the path of G that should be traversed by
the traffic to reach d. In the announcements sent from d such a path contains just
d. We say that a path P = (vn . . . v0) is available at vertex v if vn announces
P to v. Each vertex checks among its available paths that are not filtered by the
import policy, which is the best one according to its selection policy, and then
it announces that path to a set of its neighbors in accordance with the export
policy. Further, BGP has a loop detection mechanism, i.e., each vertex v ignores
a route if v is already contained in the route itself.
Policies are typically specified according to two types of relationships [7]. In
a customer-provider relationship, an AS that wants to access the Internet pays
an AS which sells this service. In a peer-peer relationship two ASes exchange
traffic without any money transfer between them. Such commercial relationships
between ASes are represented by orienting a subset of the edges of E. Namely,
edge (u, v) ∈ E is directed from u to v if u is a customer of v, while it is
undirected if u and v are peers. A path is valley-free if provider-customer and
peer-peer edges are only followed by provider-customer edges.
The Gao-Rexford [3] Export-all (GR-EA) conditions are commonly assumed
to hold in this setting [4]. GR1: G has no directed cycles that would corre-
spond to unclear customer-provider roles. GR2: Each vertex v ∈ V sends an
announcement containing a path P to a neighbor n only if path (n v)P is valley-
free. Otherwise, some AS would provide transit to either its peers or its providers
without revenues. GR3: A vertex prefers paths through customers over those
provided by peers and paths through peers over those provided by providers.
Shortest Paths: Among paths received from neighbors of the same class (cus-
tomers, peers, and provider), a vertex chooses the shortest ones. Tie Break:
If there are multiple such paths, a vertex chooses according to some tie break
rule. As in [4], we assume that the one whose next hop has lowest AS number
is chosen. Also, as in [2], to tie break equal class and equal length simple paths
Pu1 = (u v)P
v
1 and P
u
2 = (u v)P
v
2 at the same vertex u from the same neighbor
v, if v prefers P v1 over P
v
2 , then u prefers P
u
1 over P
u
2 . This choice is called policy
consistent in [2] and it can be proven that it has the nice property of making
the entire set of policies considered in this paper policy consistent. NE policy:
a vertex always exports a path except when GR2 forbids it to do so.
Since we assume that the GR-EA conditions are satisfied, then a (partially
directed) graph is sufficient to fully specify the policies of the ASes. Hence, in
the following a BGP instance is just a graph.
1.2 Understanding Hacking Strategies
We consider the following problem. A BGP instance with three specific vertices,
d, s, and m are given, where such vertices are: the AS originating a prefix pi, a
source of traffic for pi, and an attacker, respectively. All vertices, but m, behave
correctly, i.e., according to the BGP protocol and GR-EA conditions. Vertex m
is interested in two types of attacks: hijacking and interception. In the hijacking
attack m’s goal is to attract to itself at least the traffic from s to d. In the
interception attack m’s goal is to be traversed by at least the traffic from s to d.
In Fig. 1 (2, 6) is peer-to-peer and the other edges are customer-provider.
Prefix pi is owned and announced by d. According to BGP, the traffic from s
to d follows (s 6 2 1 d). In fact, 2 selects (1 d). Vertex 6 receives a unique
announcement from d (it cannot receive an announcement with (5 4 3 m 2 1 d)
since it is not valley-free). By cheating, (Example 1) m can deviate the traffic
from s to d attracting traffic from s. In fact, if m pretends to be the owner of
pi and announces it to 2, then 2 prefers, for shortest-path, (2 m) over (2 1 d).
Hence, the traffic from s to d is received by m following (s 6 2 m). A hijack!
Observe that m could be smarter (Example 2). Violating GR2, it can an-
nounce (2 1 d) to 3. Since each of 3, 4 and 5 prefers paths announced by customers
(GR3), the propagation of this path is guaranteed. Therefore, 6 has two available
paths, namely, (2 1 d) and (5 4 3 m 2 1 d). The second one is preferred because
5 is a customer of 6, while 2 is a peer of 6. Hence, the traffic from s to d is
received by m following path (s 6 5 4 3 m). Since after passing through m the
traffic reaches d following (m 2 1 d) this is an interception.
Fig. 2 allows to show a negative example (Example 3). According to BGP,
the traffic from s to d follows (s 4 d). In fact, s receives only paths (4 d) and
(1 2 3 d), both from a provider, and prefers the shortest one. Suppose that m
wants to hijack and starts just announcing pi to 6. Since all the neighbors of s
are providers, s prefers, for shortest path, (4 d) over (5 6 m) (over (1 2 3 d)
over (4 9 8 7 m)) and the hijack fails. But m can use another strategy. Since
(s 5 6 m) is shorter than (s 1 2 3 d), m can attract traffic if (4 d) is “disrupted”
and becomes not available at s. This happens if 4 selects, instead of (d), a path
received from its peer neighbor 9 (m may announce that it is the originator of
pi also to 7). However, observe that if 4 selects path (4 9 8 7 m) then 5 selects
path (5 9 8 7 m) since it is received from a peer and stops the propagation of
(s 5 6 m). Hence, s still selects path (s 1 2 3 d) and the hijack fails.
In order to cope with the lack of any security mechanism in BGP, several
variations of the protocol have been proposed by the Internet community. One of
the most famous, S-BGP, uses both origin authentication and cryptographically-
signed announcements in order to guarantee that an AS announces a path only
if it has received this path in the past.
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Fig. 1: A network for Examples 1 and
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Fig. 2: A network for Example 3.
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The attacker m has more or less constrained cheating capabilities. 1. With
the origin-spoofing cheating capabilities m can do the typical BGP announce-
ment manipulation. I.e., m can pretend to be the origin of prefix pi owned by d,
announcing this to a subset of its neighbors. 2. With the S-BGP cheating capa-
bilities m must comply with the S-BGP constraints. I.e.: (a) m cannot pretend
to be the origin of prefix pi; and (b) m can announce a path (m u)P only if u
announced P to m in the past. However, m can still announce paths that are
not the best to reach d and can decide to announce different paths to different
neighbors. In Example 2, m has S-BGP cheating capabilities.
In this paper we study the computational complexity of the hijack and of
the interception problems. The hijack problem is formally defined as fol-
lows. Instance: A BGP instance G, a source vertex s, a destination vertex d, a
manipulator vertex m, and a cheating capability for m. Question: Does there
exist a set of announcements that m can simultaneously send to its neighbors,
according to its cheating capability, that produces a stable state for G where
the traffic from s to d goes to m? The interception problem is defined in the
same way but changing “the traffic from s to d goes to m” to “the traffic from
s to d passes through m before reaching d”.
1.3 Notation and Definitions
We introduce some technical notation in order to prove our lemmas and theorems.
A ranking function determines the level of preference of paths available at vertex
v. If P1, P2 are available at v and P1 is preferred over P2 we write P1 <
v
λ P2.
The concatenation of two nonempty paths P = (vk vk−1 . . . vi), k ≥ i, and Q =
(vi vi−1 . . . v0), i ≥ 0, denoted as PQ, is the path (vk vk−1 . . . vi+1 vi vi−1 . . . v0).
Also, let P be a valley-free path from vertex v. We say that P is of class 3, 2,
or 1 if its first edge connects v with a customer, a peer, or a provider of v, re-
spectively. We also define a function fv for each vertex v, that maps each path
from v to the integer of its class. Given two paths P and P ′ available at v if
fv(P ) > fv(P ′) we say that the class of P is better than the class of P ′. In stable
routing state S, a path P = (v1 . . . vn) is disrupted at vertex vi by a path P
′ if
there exists a vertex vi of P such that vi selects path P
′. Also, if P ′ is preferred
over (vi . . . vn) because of the GR3 condition, we say that path P is disrupted
by a path of a better class. Otherwise, if P ′ is preferred over (vi . . . vn) because
of the shortest-paths criterion, we say that P is disrupted by a path of the same
class.
1.4 Routing Stability under Manipulator Attacks
BGP policies can be so complex that there exist configurations that do not
allow to reach any stable routing state (see, e.g., [6]). A routing state is stable
if there exists a time t such that after t no AS changes its selected path. If the
GR-EA conditions are satisfied [3], then a BGP network always converges to a
stable state. However, there is a subtle issue to consider in attacks. As we have
seen in the examples, m can deliberately ignore the GR-EA conditions. Anyway,
the following lemma makes it possible, in our setting, to study the hijack and
the interception problem ignoring stability related issues. First, we introduce
some notation.
Lemma 1. Let G be a BGP instance and suppose that at a certain time a ma-
nipulator m starts announcing steadily any set of arbitrary paths to its neighbors.
Routing in G converges to a stable state.
Proof. Suppose, for a contradiction, that, afterm starts its announcements, rout-
ing in G is not stable. Let u0, . . . , un be a circular sequence of vertices such that:
(1) each ui does not steadily announce a path; (2) the most preferred path
Pui = RiQi = (r
ui
1 . . . r
ui
ki
)Qi at ui that is available infinitely many times is
such that each vertex in Qi but r
ui
ki
steadily announces a path; and (3) ruiki = ui+1,
where i has to be interpreted modulo n. Such a circular sequence is called dispute-
wheel and it has been proved in [5] that if a system (with no manipulators) is not
stable then it contains a dispute-wheel. We prove that the presence of a dispute-
wheel in a GR-EA instance leads to a constradiction. Hence, a GR-EA instance
always converges to a stable state. Observe that |Ri| ≥ 2, otherwise ui would
be stable. Since m and d steadily announce some paths and because G is finite,
such a sequence exists. Observe that for each i, we have that Qi−1 >
ui
λ P
ui .
Suppose that for each ui we have that P
ui is preferred over Qi−1 either by
shortest path or by tie-break, i.e., fui(Qi−1) = f
ui(Pui) and |Qi−1| ≥ |P
ui |.
Inequality |Ri| ≥ 2 implies |P
ui | > |Qi|. Hence, we have |Qi−1| ≥ |P
ui | > |Qi| ≥
|Pui+1 |. Following the cycle of inequalities we have a contradiction as we obtain
|Qi| > |Qi|.
Conversely, let um be a vertex that prefers P
um over Qm−1 for better class,
that is fum(Pum) > fum(Qm−1). For each i = 0, . . . ,m − 1,m + 1, . . . , n we
have fui(Pui) ≥ fui(Qi−1) ≥ f
ui−1(Pui−1) because of the GR2 and GR3 con-
ditions. Following the cycle of inequalities we have a contradiction as we obtain
fum(Pum) > fum(Pum). ⊓⊔
The existence of a stable state (pure Nash equilibrium) in a game where
one player can deviate from a standard behavior has been proved, in a different
setting in [2]. Such a result and Lemma 1 are somehow complementary since
the export policies they consider are more general than Export-All, while the
convergence to the stable state is not guaranteed (even if such a stable state is
always reachable from any initial state).
2 Checking if an Origin-Spoofing BGP Attack Exists
In this section, we show that, in general, it is hard to find an attack strategy
if m has an origin-spoofing cheating capability (Theorem 1), while the problem
turns to be easier in a realistic setting (Theorem 2).
A hijacking can be obviously found in exponential time by a simple brute
force approach which simulates every possible attack strategy and verifies its
effectiveness. The following result in the case the Internet graph has no bound
constraints may be somehow expected.
Theorem 1. If the manipulator has origin-spoofing cheating capabilities, then
problem hijack is NP-hard.
Proof. We prove that hijack is NP-hard by a reduction from the 3-sat problem.
Let F be a logical formula in conjunctive normal form with variables X1 . . . Xn
and clauses C1 . . . Ch where each clause Ci contains three literals. We construct
a GR-EA compliant BGP instance G as follows.
Graph G consists of 4 structures: the Intermediate structure, the Short
structure, the Long structure, and the Disruptive structure. See Fig. 3.
The Intermediate structure is the only portion of G containing valley-free
paths joining s and m that are shorter than the one contained in the Long
structure. It is composed by edge (m, q1) and two directed paths from s to q1
of length 2n: the first path is composed by edges (s, tn), (tn, qn), (qn, tn−1),
(tn−1, qn−1), (qn−1, tn−2), . . . , (t2, q2), (q2, t1), and (t1, q1) while the second path
is composed by edges (s, t¯n), (t¯n, qn), (qn, t¯n−1), (t¯n−1, qn−1), (qn−1, t¯n−2), . . . ,
(t¯2, q2), (q2, t¯1), and (t¯1, q1). Obviously, these two paths can be used to construct
an exponential number of other paths. We say that a path traverses the Inter-
mediate structure if it passes through vertices s and q1.
The Short structure consists of h paths joining s and d. Each path has length
4 and has edges (s, ci,1), (ci,1, ci,2), (ci,2, ci,3), and (ci,3, d) (1 ≤ i ≤ h). The Long
structure is a directed path of length 2n + 3 with edges (s, w1), (w1, w2), . . . ,
(w2n+1, w2n+2), and (w2n+2, d). The Disruptive structure is composed by 2n
paths plus 3h edges. The 2n paths are defined as follows. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n we define
two paths. The first path contains a directed subpath of length 2n+ 2 from m
to xi (dotted lines in Fig. 3), plus the undirected edge (xi, ti). The second path
contains a directed subpath of length 2n+2 from m to x¯i (dotted lines in Fig. 3)
plus the undirected edge (x¯i, t¯i). The 3h edges are added to G as follows. For
each clause Ci and each literal Li,j of Ci, which is associated to a variable xk, if
Li,j is positive, then we add (xk, ci,j), otherwise we add (x¯k, ci,j). We say that
a path traverses the Disruptive structure if it traverses it from m to s.
Vertices s, d, and m have source, destination, and manipulator roles, respec-
tively.
Intuitively, the proof works as follows. The paths that allow traffic to go
from s to m are only those passing through the Disruptive structure and the
Intermediate structure. Also, the paths through the Intermediate structure
are shorter than the one through the Long structure, which is shorter than
those through the Disruptive structure.
If m does not behave maliciously, s receives only paths that traverse the
Short structure and the Long structure. In this case s selects one of the paths
in the Short structure according to its tie break policy.
Observe that if m wants to attract traffic from s, then: (i) a path from m
traversing entirely the Intermediate structure has to reach s and (ii) all paths
contained in the Short structure have to be disrupted by a path announced
by m.
Observe that only valley-free paths contained in the Intermediate struc-
ture, which have length at least 2n+ 2, can be used to attract traffic from s. If
(i) does not hold, then s selects the path contained in the Long structure or
a path contained in the Short structure. If (ii) does not hold, then s selects a
path contained in the Short structure.
Our construction is such that the 3-sat formula is satisfiable iffm can attract
the traffic from s to d. To understand the interplay between our construction
and the 3-sat problem, consider (see Fig. 3) the behavior of m with respect
to neighbors x2 and x¯2. If m wants to disrupt path (s c1,1 c1,2 c1,3 d) (which
corresponds to making clause C1 true) it might announce the prefix to x2. This
would have the effect of disrupting (s c1,1 c1,2 c1,3 d) by better class. Observe
that at the same time this would disrupt all the paths through t2. If m is able
to disrupt all the paths in the Short structure, then s has to select a path
in the Intermediate structure. However, m has to be careful for two reasons.
First, m has to announce the prefix to q1 (otherwise no path can traverse the
Intermediate structure). Second, m cannot announce the prefix both to x2
and to x¯2 (variable X2 cannot be true and false at the same time). In this case,
all the paths through t2 and t¯2 are disrupted. Also, consider that the paths that
reach s through t2 and x2 (t¯2 and x¯2) and that remain available are longer than
the one in the Long structure.
Now we show that if F is satisfiable, then m can attract traffic from s. Let
M be a truth assignment to variables X1, . . . , Xn satisfying formula F . Let m
announce to its neighbors paths as follows: if Xi (i = 1, . . . , n) is true then m
announces the prefix to xi and does not announce anything to x¯i; otherwise m
does the opposite. Also, the prefix in announced to q1 in all cases.
We have that: 1. all paths (one for each clause) in the Short structure are
disrupted by better class from the paths in the Disruptive structure; 2. one
path belonging to the Intermediate structure is available at s; 3. the path in
the Long structure, available at s, is longer than the path in the Intermediate
structure. Hence, m can attract traffic from s.
Now we prove that if manipulator m can attract traffic from s, then F is
satisfiable.
We already know from the above discussion that m can attract traffic from
s only using paths that traverse the Intermediate structure entirely. We also
know that these paths are longer than paths contained in the Short structure
and therefore, every path contained in the Short structure has to be disrupted.
We have that paths contained in the Short structure can be disrupted only
by using paths contained in the Disruptive structure. Let V ∗ be the set of
neighbors of m different from q1 that receive an announcement of the prefix
from m. Observe that s, to attract traffic from m, has to announce the prefix
to q1. From the above discussion we have that for i = 1, . . . , n it is not possible
both for xi and for x¯i to receive the announcement. Also, since all paths in the
Short structure have been disrupted, for j = 1, . . . , h at least one of the cj,k
(k = 1, 2, 3) receives an announcement of the prefix from m. Hence, we define
an assignment M , which satisfies formula F , as follows: for each i = 1, . . . , n, if
xi ∈ V
∗, then M(Xi) = ⊤, otherwise M(Xi) = ⊥. ⊓⊔
Surprisingly, in a more realistic scenario, where the length of valley-free paths
is bounded by a constant k, we have that in the origin-spoofing setting an attack
strategy can be found in polynomial time (nO(k), where n is the number of
vertices of G). Let N be the set of neighbors of m. Indeed, the difficulty of
the hijack problem in the origin-spoofing setting depends on the fact that m
has to decide to which of the vertices in N it announces the attacked prefix
pi, which leads to an exponential number of possibilities. However, when the
longest valley-free path in the graph is bounded by a constant k, it is possible to
design a polynomial-time algorithm based on the following intuition, that will be
formalized below. Suppose m is announcing pi to a subset A ⊆ N of its neighbors
and path p = (z . . . n m) is available at an arbitrary vertex z of the graph. Let
n1, n2 be two vertices of N \ A. If p is disrupted (is not disrupted) by better
class both when pi is announced either to n1 or to n2, then p is disrupted (is not
disrupted) by better class when pi is announced to both n1 and n2. This implies
that once m has a candidate path p∗ for attracting traffic from s, it can check
independently to which of its neighbors it can announce pi without disrupting p∗
by better class, which guarantees that a path from m to z longer than p cannot
be selected at z.
In order to prove Theorem 2, we introduce the following lemmata that relate
attacks to the structure of the Internet.
Lemma 2. Consider a valley-free path p = (vn . . . v1) and consider an attack
of m such that v1 announces a path pv1 to v2 to reach prefix pi and p is possibly
disrupted only by same class. Vertex vn selects a path pn ≤
vn
λ ppv1 .
Proof. We prove inductively that each vertex vi in p selects a path pi ≤
vi
λ
(vi . . . v1) such that |pi| ≤ |(vi . . . v1)|. In the base case (n = 1), the statement
holds since p1 ≤
v1
λ p1 and |p1| ≤ |p1|. In the inductive step (n > 1), by induction
hypothesis and NE policy, vertex vi receives a path pi−1 from vertex vi−1 such
that pi−1 ≤
vi−1
λ (vi−1 . . . v1) and |pi−1| ≤ |(vi−1 . . . v1)|. Two cases are possible:
pi−1 contains vi, or not. In the second case, vi selects a path pi ≤
vi
λ (vi vi−1)pi−1
and since path (vi . . . v1) is disrupted only by same class, we have also |pi| ≤
|(vi vi−1)pi−1| ≤ |(vi . . . v1)|. In the first case, let p
′ be the subpath of pi−1 from
vi. Observe that since (vi vi−1)pi−1 is a valley-free path and vertex vi is repeated
in that path, we have that fvi(p′) > fvi((vi vi−1)pi−1) = f
vi(vi . . . v1), which
is not possible since (vi . . . v1) cannot be disrupted by better class. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3. Consider a successful attack for m and let psm be the path selected
at s. Let psd be a valley-free path from s to d such that it does not traverse m
and such that psd <
s
λ psm. Path psd is disrupted by a path of better class.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that there exists a valley-free path psd from s to
d such that psd <
s
λ psm and psd is not disrupted by a path of better class. If psd
is not disrupted, then it is available at vertex s. It implies that s selects psd as its
best path, which leads to a contradiction. Otherwise, suppose psd is disrupted
only by same class. By Lemma 2 we have a contradiction since s selects a path
p ≤sλ (psd) <
s
λ (psm) different from psm. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4. Let p = (vn . . . v1) be a valley-free path. Consider an attack where
v1 announces a path p1 to v2. Vertex vn selects a path of class at least f
vn(p).
Proof. We prove that each vertex vi in p selects a path pi such that f
vi(pi) ≥
fvi(vi . . . v1). In the base case (n = 1), the statement holds since f
v1(p1) ≥
fv1(p1). In the inductive step (n > 1), by induction hypothesis and NE pol-
icy, vertex vi receives a path pi−1 from vertex vi−1 such that f
vi−1(pi−1) ≥
fvi−1(vi−1 . . . v1). Two cases are possible: pi−1 contains vi or not. In the sec-
ond case, vi selects a path pi ≤
vi
λ (vi vi−1)pi−1 which implies that f
vi(pi) ≥
fvi(vi . . . v1). In the first case, let p
′ be the subpath of pi−1 from vi. Observe
that since (vi vi−1)pi−1 is a valley-free path and vertex vi is repeated in that
path, we have that, fvi(p′) > fvi((vi vi−1)pi−1) = f
vi(vi . . . v1), and the state-
ment holds also in this case. ⊓⊔
Theorem 2. If the manipulator has origin-spoofing cheating capabilities and
the length of the longest valley-free path is bounded by a constant, then problem
hijack is in P.
Proof. We tackle the problem with Alg. 1. First, observe that line 9 tests if
a certain set of announcements causes a successful attack and, in that case, it
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for the hijack problem where m has origin-spoofing
capabilities and the longest valley-free path in the graph is bounded.
1: Input: instance of hijack problem, m has origin-spoofing cheating capabilities;
2: Output: an attack pattern if the attack exists, fail otherwise;
3: let Psm be the set of all valley-free paths from s to m;
4: for all psm in Psm do
5: let w be the vertex of psm adjacent tom; let A be a set of vertices and initialize
A to {w}; let N be the set of the neighbors of m;
6: for all n in N \ {w} do
7: if there is no path p through (m,n) to a vertex x of psm such that f
x(p) >
fx(pxm), where pxm is the subpath of psm from x to m then
8: insert n into A
9: if the attack succeeds when m announces pi only to the vertices in A then
10: return A
11: return fail
returns the corresponding set of neighbors to whomm announces prefix pi. Hence,
if Alg. 1 returns without failure it is trivial to see that it found a successful attack.
Suppose now that there exists a successful attack a∗ from m that is not found
by Alg. 1. Let p∗sm be the path selected by s in attack a
∗. Let A∗ be the set of
neighbors of m that receives prefix pi from m in the successful attack.
Consider the iteration of the Alg. 1 where path p∗sm is analyzed in the outer
loop. At the end of the iteration Alg. 1 constructs a set A of neighbors of m. Let
a be an attack from m where m announces pi only to the vertices in A.
First, we prove that A∗ ⊆ A. Suppose by contradiction that there exists a
vertex n ∈ A∗ that is not contained in A. It implies that there exists a valley-free
path p through (m,n) to a vertex x of p∗sm such that f
x(p) > fx(pxm), where
pxm is the subpath of p
∗
sm from x to m. Since m announces pi to n, by Lemma 4,
we have that x selects a path p′ of class at least fx(p), that is a contradiction
since p∗sm would be disrupted by better class. Hence, A
∗ ⊆ A.
Now, we prove that attack a is a successful attack for m. Consider a valley-
free path psd from s to d that does not traverse m and is preferred over p
∗
sm. By
Lemma 3 it is disrupted by better class in attack a∗. By Lemma 4, since A∗ ⊆ A,
we have that also in a path psd is disrupted by better class. Let x be the vertex
adjacent to s in psd. Observe that, vertex s cannot have an available path (s x)p
to d such that (s x)p <sλ p
∗
sm, because (s x)p must be disrupted by better class.
Moreover, consider path p∗sm. Since in a
∗ path p∗sm is not disrupted by better
class by a path to d, by Lemma 4, there does not exist a path p′xd from a vertex
x of p∗sm to d of class higher than pxm, where pxm is the subpath of p
∗
sm from x
to m. Hence, path p∗sm cannot be disrupted by better class by a path to d. Also,
observe that for each n ∈ A there is no path p through (m,n) to a vertex x of
p∗sm such that f
x(p) > fx(pxm), where pxm is the subpath of psm from x to m.
Hence, p∗sm can be disrupted only by same class. By Lemma 2, we have that s
selects a path p such that p ≤sλ p
∗
sm. Since path p cannot be a path to d, attack
a is successful. This is a contradiction since we assumed that Alg. 1 failed.
Finally, since the length of the valley-free paths is bounded, the iterations of
the algorithm where paths in Psm are considered require a number of steps that
is polynomial in the number of vertices of the graph. Also, the disruption checks
can be performed in polynomial time by using the algorithm in [12]. ⊓⊔
3 S-BGP Gives Hackers Hard Times
We open this section by strengthening the role of S-BGP as a security protocol.
Indeed, S-BGP adds more complexity to the problem of finding an attack strat-
egy (Theorem 3). After that we also provide an answer to a conjecture posed
in [4] about hijacking and interception attacks in S-BGP when a single path
is announced by the manipulator. In this case, we prove that every successful
hijacking attack is also an interception attack (Theorem 5).
Theorem 3. If the manipulator has S-BGP cheating capabilities and the length
of the longest valley-free path is bounded by a constant, then problem hijack is
NP-hard.
Proof. We reduce from a version of 3-sat where each variable appears at most
three times and each positive literal at most once [10]. Let F be a logical formula
in conjunctive normal form with variables X1 . . . Xn and clauses C1 . . . Ch. We
build a BGP instance G (see Fig. 4) consisting of 4 structures: Intermediate,
Short, Long, andDisruptive. The Long structure is a directed path of length
6 with edges (s, w1), (w1, w2), . . . , (w4, w5), and (w5, d). The Intermediate
structure consists of a valley-free path joining m and s. It has length 4 and it is
composed by a directed path (s j3 j2 j1), and a directed edge (m, j1). The Short
structure has h directed paths from s to d. Each path has length at most 4 and
has edges (s, ci,1), (ci,1, ci,2), . . . , (ci,v(Ci), d) (1 ≤ i ≤ h), where v(Ci) is the size
of Ci. The Disruptive structure contains, for each variable Xi vertices, ri, ti,
xi, pi and p
′
i. Vertices, ri, ti, and xi, are reached via long directed paths from m
and are connected by (ti, pi), (xi, pi), (xi, p
′
i), (ri, j3), (pi, j3), and (pi, d). Finally,
supposeXi occurs in clause Cj with a literal in position l. If the literal is negative
the undirected edge (pi, cj,l) is added, otherwise, edges (pi, cj,l), (ri, cj,l), (cj,l, j3),
and undirected edge (p′i, cj,l) are added. An edge connects m to d. Vertices s, d,
and m have source, destination, and manipulator roles, respectively.
Intuitively, the proof works as follows. The paths that allow traffic to go
from s to m are only those passing through the Disruptive structure and the
one in the Intermediate structure. Also, the path through the Intermediate
structure is shorter than the one through the Long structure, which is shorter
than those through the Disruptive structure. If m does not behave maliciously,
s receives only paths traversing the Short structure and the Long structure.
In this case s selects one of the paths in the Short structure according to its tie
break policy. If m wants to attract traffic from s, then: (i) path (j3 j2 j1 m d)
must be available at s and (ii) all paths contained in the Short structure must
be disrupted by a path announced by m. If (i) does not hold, then s selects the
path contained in either the Long structure or the Short structure. If (ii) does
not hold, then s selects a path contained in the Short structure.
Our construction is such that the 3-sat formula is true iff m can attract
the traffic from s to d. To understand the relationship with the 3-sat problem,
consider the behavior of m with respect to variable X1 (see Fig. 4) that appears
with a positive literal in the first position of clause C1, a negative literal in the
first position of C2 and a negative literal in the second position of Ch.
First, we explore the possible actions that m can perform in order to disrupt
paths in the Short structure. Since m has S-BGP cheating capabilities, m is
constrained to propagate only the announcements it receives. If m does not
behave maliciously, m receives path (d) from d and paths Pr1 , Pt1 , and Px1
from r1, t1, and x1, respectively. These paths have the following properties: Pr1
contains vertex c1,1 that is contained in the path of the Short structure that
corresponds to clause C1; paths Pt1 and Px1 both contain vertex p1 and do not
contain vertex c1,1 since p1 prefers (p1 d) over (p1 c1,1 c1,2 c1,3 d).
Now, we analyze what actions are not useful for m to perform an attack. If m
issues any announcement towards t1 or r1 the path traversing the Intermediate
structure is disrupted by better class. Also, if m sends a path Pr1 , Pt1 , or Px1
towards rj , tj, or xj , with j = 2, . . . , n, the path traversing the Intermediate
structure is disrupted by better class. Also, if m sends (m d) to x1, then the
path traversing the Intermediate structure is disrupted from c1,1 by better
class. If m sends Px1 to x1, then it is discarded by x1 because of loop detection.
In each of these casesm cannot disrupt any path traversing the Short structure
without disrupting the path traversing the Intermediate structure. Hence, m
can disrupt path in the Short structure without disrupting the path traversing
the Intermediate structure only announcing Pr1 and Pt1 from m towards x1.
If path Pt1 is announced to x1, then p1 discards that announcement because
of loop detection and path (s c1,1 c1,2 c1,3 d) is disrupted from p
′
1 by better class.
Also, the path through the Intermediate structure remains available because
the announcement through p′1 cannot reach j3 from c1,1, otherwise valley-freeness
would be violated. Hence, announcing path Pt1 , corresponds to assigning true
value to variableX1, since the only path in the Short structure that is disrupted
is the one that corresponds to the clause that contains the positive literal of X1.
If path Pr1 is announced to x1, then c1,1 discards that announcement because
of loop detection and both paths (s c2,1 c2,2 c2,3 d) and (s ch,1 ch,2 ch,3 d) are
disrupted by better class from p1. Also, the path through the Intermediate
structure remains available because the announcement through p1 cannot reach
j3 from c2,1 or ch,2, otherwise valley-freeness would be violated. Hence, announc-
ing path Pr1 , corresponds to assigning false value to variable X1, since the only
paths in the Short structure that are disrupted are the ones that correspond
to the clauses that contain a negative literal of X1.
Hence, announcing path Pt1 (Pr1) from m to x1 corresponds to assigning
the true (false) value to variable X1. As a consequence, m can disrupt every
path in the Short structure without disrupting the path in the Intermediate
structure iff formula F is satisfiable. ⊓⊔
Theorem 4. If the manipulator has S-BGP cheating capabilities and its degree
is bounded by a constant, then problem hijack is in P.
Proof. Observe that if the manipulator m has S-BGP cheating capabilities, the
degree of the manipulator’s vertex is bounded by a constant k, then problem
hijack is in P. In fact, since m has at most k available paths plus the empty
path, a brute force approach approach needs to explore (k + 1)k number of
possible cases. ⊓⊔
To study the relationship between hijacking and interception we introduce
the following technical lemma.
Lemma 5. Let G be a GR-EA compliant BGP instance, let m be a vertex with
S-BGP cheating capabilities, and let d 6= m be any vertex of G. All vertices that
admit a class c valley-free path to d not containing m have an available path of
class c or better to d, irrespective of the paths propagated by m to its neighbors.
Proof. Let p = (vn . . . v1) be a valley-free path to d not containing m. We
prove by induction on vertices v1, . . . , vn that each vertex vi has an available
path of class fvi(vi . . . v1) or better. In the base case i = 2, v2 is directly
connected to d and the statements trivially holds. Suppose that vertex vi, with
i > 2, has an available path of class fvi(vi . . . v1). Hence, vi selects a path p
∗
such that fvi(p∗) ≥ fvi(vi . . . v1). Also, since (vi+1 vi . . . v1) is valley-free even
(vi+1 vi)p
∗ is valley-free. Then, vi announces (because of the NE policy) its best
path p∗ to vi+1. There are two possible cases: either p
∗ does not contain vi+1
or not. In the first case, path (vi+1 vi)p
∗ is available at vi+1 and the statement
holds. In the second case, consider the subpath p∗vi+1 of p
∗ from vi+1 to d. The
statement easily follows because fvi+1(p∗vi+1) ≥ f
vi+1((vi+1 vi)p
∗. ⊓⊔
Theorem 5. Let m be a manipulator with S-BGP cheating capabilities. If m an-
nounces the same path to any arbitrary set of its neighbors, then every successful
hijacking attack is also a successful interception attack. If m announces different
paths to different vertices, then the hijacking may not be an interception.
Proof. We prove the following more technical statement that implies the first
part of the theorem. Let G be a BGP instance, let m be a vertex with S-BGP
cheating capabilities. Let p be a path available atm in the stable state S reached
when m behaves correctly. Suppose that m starts announcing p to any subset of
its neighbors. Let S′ be the corresponding routing state. Path p remains available
at vertex m in S′. The truth of the statement implies that m can forward the
traffic to d by exploiting p.
Suppose for a contradiction that path p is disrupted in S′ when m propagates
it to a subset of its neighbors. Let x be the first vertex of p that prefers a different
path px (p is disrupted by px) in S
′ and let p′ be the subpath of p from vertex d
to x (see Fig. 5). Observe that p is not a subpath of px as x cannot select a path
that passes through itself. Since px is not available at x in S, let y be the vertex
in px closest to d that selects a path py that is preferred over p
′
x in S, where p
′
x
is the subpath of px from y to d.
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cannot intercept traffic to d but
it can hijack it.
We have two cases: either fx(px) > f
x(p′) or fx(px) = f
x(p′) (i.e., px is
preferred to p′ by better or by same class).
Suppose that fx(px) > f
x(p′). By Lemma 5, since there exists a valley-free
path px from x to d that does not traverse m, then x has an available path of
class at least fx(px). Hence, x cannot select path p
′ in S, a contradiction.
Suppose that fx(px) = f
x(p′). Two cases are possible: either py contains x
or not. In the first case either fy(py) > f
y(p′x) or f
y(py) = f
y(p′x). If f
y(py) >
fy(p′x), then we have that f
y(py) ≤ f
x(p′) = fx(px) ≤ f
y(p′x), a contradiction.
If fy(py) = f
y(p′x), we have that |p
′
x| < |px| ≤ |p
′| < |py|. A contradiction since
a longer path is preferred.
The second case (fx(px) = f
x(p′) and py does not contain x) is more complex.
We have that |p′| ≥ |px|. Also, by Lemma 5, since py and p
′
x do not pass through
m, then y has an available path of class at least max{fy(py), f
y(p′x)}. As y
alternatively chooses py and p
′
x we have that f
y(py) = f
y(p′x), which implies
that |p′x| ≥ |py|. Denote by pxy the subpath (vm . . . v0) of px, where v0 = y
and vm = x. Consider routing in state S. Two cases are possible: either pxypy
is available at x or not. In the first case, since |p′| ≥ |px| = |pxyp
′
x| ≥ |pxypy|,
we have a contradiction because p′ would not be selected in S. In the second
case, we will prove that for each vertex vh 6= x in pxy we have that |ph| ≤
|(vh . . . v0)py|, where ph is the path selected by vh in S. This implies that
|(vm vm−1)pm−1| ≤ |pxypy| ≤ |px| ≤ |p
′| and this leads to a contradiction. In
fact, if |(vm vm−1)pm−1| < |p
′|, then we have a contradiction because p′ would not
be selected in S. Otherwise, if |(vm vm−1)pm−1| = |p
′|, we have that |px| = |p
′|.
Then, x prefers px over p
′ because of tie break. We have a contradiction since
also (vm vm−1)pm−1 is preferred over p
′ because of tie break in S.
Finally, we prove that for each vertex vh 6= x in pxy we have that |ph| ≤
|(vh . . . v0)py|. This trivially holds for v0 = y. We prove that if it holds for vi
then it also holds for vi+1. If vi+1 selects (vi+1 vi)pi, then the property holds.
Otherwise, (vi+1 vi)pi is disrupted either by better class or by same class by a
path pi+1. In the first case, we have that either pi+1 traversesm or not. Suppose
pi+1 traverses m and let q
′ be the neighbor of vi+1 on pi+1. Since pi+1 disrupts
(vi+1 vi)pi by better class, then pi+1 is composed by a directed path from d to q
′
and an edge (q′, vi+1) that can be either an oriented edge from q
′ to vi+1 or an
unoriented edge. Let n be the neighbor of m on p and n′ be the neighbor of n on
p different from m. Consider the relationship between n and n′. Suppose n is a
customer or a peer of n′. Ifm is a provider or a peer of n, then p is not valley-free
and p cannot be available atm in S, which leads to a contradiction. Otherwise, if
m is a customer of n, then n would have preferred the best path from its customer
m rather than the path learnt from its provider n′. It implies that p would not be
available at m in S, that is a contradiction. Hence, n is a provider of n′ and the
subpath of p from d to n is a directed path. Since fx(px) = f
x(p′), we have that
also px is a directed path from d to x. Therefore, vi+1 is a provider of vi and so
(vi+1 vi)pi would not be disrupted by better class in S, which is a contradiction.
Hence, pi+1 does not traverse m. By Lemma 5, a path of a class better than
(vi+1 . . . v0)p
′
x is available at vi+1 and so vi+1 cannot select (vi+1 . . . v0)p
′
x in
S′, a contradiction. In the second case ((vi+1 vi)pi is disrupted by same class by
a path pi+1) we have that |pi+1| ≤ |(vi+1 vi)pi| ≤ |(vi+1 . . . v0)py|. The second
inequality comes from the induction hypothesis.
This concludes the first part of the proof. For proving the second part we
show an example where m announces different paths to different neighbors and
the resulting hijacking is not an interception. Consider the BGP instance in
Fig. 6. In order to hijack traffic from s, vertices 1 and 4 must be hijacked. Hence,
m must announce (m 3 4 d) to 2 and (m 2 1 d) to 3. However, since (3 4 d) and
(2 1 d) are no longer available at m the interception fails. ⊓⊔
4 Conclusions and Open Problems
Given a communication flow between two ASes we studied how difficult it is for
a malicious AS m to devise a strategy for hijacking or intercepting that flow.
This problem marks a sharp difference between BGP and S-BGP. Namely, while
in a realistic scenario the problem is computationally tractable for typical BGP
attacks it is NP-hard for S-BGP. This gives new evidence of the effectiveness
of the adoption of S-BGP. It is easy to see that all the NP-hardness results
that we obtained for the hijacking problem easily extend to the interception
problem. Further, we solved a problem left open in [4], showing when performing
a hijacking in S-BGP is equivalent to performing an interception.
Several problems remain open: 1. We focused on a unique m. How difficult
is it to find a strategy involving several malicious ASes [4]? 2. In [13] it has been
proposed to disregard the AS-paths length in the BGP decision process. How
difficult is it to find an attack strategy in this different model?
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